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ABSTRACT 
This paper focuses on functional separation. After reviewing the literature on separation in 
its various guises and describing the circumstances that culminated in the creation of 
Openreach in the UK, the paper focuses on the implementation of the undertakings. It is 
shown that difficulties have been encountered in the implementation of the undertakings, 
and that while the relationship between BT and other service providers may have improved, 
tensions remain.  
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 1. INTRODUCTION 
Over the course of the last year or so there has been considerable interest in the 
implementation of functional separation within fixed telecommunications markets. In 
these markets, which are largely but not exclusively to be found within the European 
Union, functional separation is seen as a way to resolve the tensions that exist between 
incumbent operators and those other service providers that require access to incumbents’ 
networks to deliver their own services.  
At the forefront of the implementation of functional separation is the UK. In late 2005, 
OFCOM and BT agreed on a series of undertakings that culminated in the creation of a 
new company – Openreach – to run BT’s local access network. Accompanying the 
establishment of Openreach was the imposition of key performance indicators and 
penalties for non-achievement. As Openreach is clearly an important landmark in the 
development of the UK telecommunications market, this paper will focus on the 
implementation of the undertakings to date. With this in mind, the remainder of this 
paper is divided into five sections. A brief overview of the different types of separation 
possible within the telecommunications industry is provided in Section 2. Background 
information regarding the adoption of functional separation is detailed in Section 3, while 
Section 4 focuses on the implementation of the undertakings. The adoption of functional 
separation in the UK is appraised in Section 5, and conclusions drawn in Section 6. 
2. Literature 
Any assessment of functional separation within the UK raises two questions: what is 
functional separation and what has been the UK experience? This section will address 
the former of these questions, while the remainder of the paper will address the second 
question. A useful starting point when answering the first question is Xavier & Ypsilanti 
(2004). Through focusing on the separation of competitive from non-competitive 
services, the authors identify (Ibid.: 76) a range of separation measures that have been 
implemented within the telecommunications industry, namely:  
 
• accounting, functional and corporate separation; 
• separation into regional operators; 
• separation of local from long-distance services; 
• separation of local and mobile services; 
• separation of local and broadband/advanced services; 
• separation of an incumbent into smaller, vertically integrated, carriers. 
 
With respect to structural separation, four different approaches are identified (Ibid.: 77-
81). In the first of these – LoopCo – the incumbent divests its access business to form a 
new company while in the second – NetCo – an arms-length relationship is established 
between the incumbent’s access and non-access networks. The establishment of an 
Alternative Distribution Company is the third approach suggested, and entails the 
collective ownership of the non-competitive assets by those operators present in the 
competitive parts of the market. The final approached suggested is that of voluntary 
suspension.1  
Although all four approaches have been variously discussed, it is not altogether surprising 
that attention has focused on the LoopCo and NetCo proposals. Cave (2002), 
Dounoukos & Henderson (2003) and Xavier & Ypsilanti (2004) identify a range of 
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 factors that need to be taken into consideration regarding the viability of the LoopCo 
option. One such factor is the network scope of LoopCo, while another is whether 
coordination problems between LoopCo and other operators would result as a 
consequence of technological advances. With respect to the restructuring of BT 
announced in late 2000, Sandbach (2001: 200) stated that the proposed NetCo 
inadequately addressed the local loop issues as it would cover both the copper and 
switched network. That is, the possibility remained for NetCo to favour its own services 
or those provided elsewhere in BT.  
Cave (2002: 30) argues that with the NetCo option there is the possibility that the 
company will leverage the market power accruing from the monopoly part of the 
business into those that are competitive. In addition, he suggests that the pace of 
technical innovation will slow under the NetCo option as service providers would have 
to convince NetCo that sufficient demand existed for it to warrant making the necessary 
investment.  
Due to the problems and uncertainties associated with both the LoopCo and NetCo 
proposals, it is not surprise that attention has focused on other ways of resolving the 
tensions that exist within the telecommunications market. Cave (2006a: 94), for example, 
identifies six alternatives as follows: 
• creation of a wholesale division; 
• virtual separation; 
• business separation; 
• business separation with localised incentives; 
• business separation with separate governance arrangements; 
• legal separation. 
 
According to Cave (2006a: 94), accounting separation at the time of writing was more or 
less the modus operandi of European incumbents with the exception of BT. In terms of 
the six identified alternatives, BT/Openreach falls under ‘business separation with local 
incentives’ and consequently is closer to the ownership separation end than the 
accounting end.  
BT/Openreach is an example of functional separation. According to the European 
Regulators Group (2007: 2), this involves the selective separation of those parts of the 
network that are difficult for other operators to replicate but which they need to access in 
order to provide their own services. This is frequently interpreted as the separation of the 
incumbent’s wholesale and retail businesses from one another. This is, however, slightly 
misleading. If the focus is solely on those parts of the incumbent’s network that cannot 
be replicated then the scope of the functional separation may be narrower than is implied 
by the separation of wholesale from retail (European Regulators Group, 2007: 8).  
Regardless of the extent to which functional separation is implemented, the result is to run 
and manage one part of the network separately from the rest. The separated part of the 
incumbent should be provided with local incentives so that it acts in the interests of all its 
customers, internal and external, and not in the interest of its parent company.2 In addition 
to the use of local incentives, the European Regulators Group suggests (2007: 2f) a range 
of ‘key elements’ that need to be provided if functional separation is to be effective.3
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 3. Background 
Before providing a brief overview of the events that culminated in the establishment of 
Openreach in late 2005, it is necessary to note that the decision to initiate the strategic 
review of telecommunication can be located at the confluence of three sets of drivers. 
The first of these drivers was the need to incorporate EU directives into the UK 
regulatory framework, while the second was the relatively recent establishment of 
OFCOM in 2003. Thus, the strategic review could be viewed as drawing a line under the 
old regulatory framework and providing a basis on which converged regulation could 
progress. 
The review could also be regarded as being a reponse to a third set of drivers, namely, 
the failure of competition to develop as anticipated in the UK. Although some 
companies had invested in their own infrastructure, these networks lacked scale 
(OFCOM, 2004a: 53). The cable operators, which operated the most extensive networks 
geographically, collectively covered less than half of the population and their ability to 
compete was limited by their continued financial woes4. Service based competition had 
been possible since the late-1990s (OFCOM, 2004c: 53) but had enjoyed only limited 
success because, it was alleged, BT had abused its dominant position in the wholesale 
market to enhance its retail competitiveness (Wilsdon & Jones, 2002).  
The results of such anti-competitive behaviour can be seen with respect to broadband 
and local loop unbundling. Although towards the end of the 1990s many companies 
expressed an interest to offer broadband services, most subsequently left the market 
(Turner, 2003: 6). One consequence of this was that only a handful of companies 
emerged to compete against BT, while another was the limited uptake of local loop 
unbundling in the UK.5 With this in mind, the strategic review could also be viewed as 
being driven by the desire to enhance competition within the broadband 
telecommunications market and to encourage greater adoption of local loop unbundling. 
 
The strategic review of telecommunications 
At the end of 2003, OFCOM announced its intention to hold a review of the 
telecommunications market during the following year (OFCOM, 2004a). The initial 
consultation document was wide-ranging in nature, raising issues that were subsequently 
clarified in the second consultation document (OFCOM, 2004b). Central to the second 
consultation document was the idntification of three regulatory options, the first of 
which was deregulation. OFCOM concluded, however, that this was not possible, not 
least because sector-specific regulation was faster and more precise than the alternatives. 
The second option was a reference under the Enterprise Act 2002 to the Competition 
Commission. Such a reference would inevitably necessitate a wide-ranging review of the 
telecommunications market that could result in the eventual imposition of structural 
remedies. The third option, the one prefered by OFCOM, was termed ‘real equality of 
access’ and would enable those companies purchasing wholesale products from BT to do 
so on the same term as BT’s own retail operations. Thus, wholesale customers would 
have access to (OFCOM, 2004c: 14): 
 
• the same or a similar set of regulated wholesale products as BT’s own retail 
activities; 
• at the same prices as BT’s own retail activities; and, 
• using the same or similar transactional processes as BT’s own retail activities.  
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 Two different types of equivalence were proposed – outcome and input – and a range of 
products identified where it could be applied (OFCOM, 2004b: 68). In the case of 
equivalence of outcome, wholesale customers receive products that are comparable to 
those offered to BT’s own retail operations but the underlying processes would not be 
the same. In contrast, where equivalence of input is applied, wholesale customers receive 
the same products as BT’s own retail operations using the same set of underlying 
processes (OFCOM, 2004c: 67f).  
Recognising that a range of issues had been identified by many of BT’s wholesale 
customers during the consultative process which these customers  believed placed them 
at a competitive disadvantage relative to BT (Ibid.: 70), there was also a behavioural 
dimension to equivalence. While the range of issues highlighted was broad, two areas in 
particular – the incentives for inappropriate behaviour and transparency – were singled 
out as areas where action could be taken. This said, OFCOM did note that BT had, in 
the past, devoted considerable effort and resources to addressing the complaints raised 
by its competitors. 
  
Undertakings in lieu of a reference under the Enterprise Act 2002 
In June 2005, OFCOM (2005a) announced that it was launching a consultation to determine whether it 
should accept the undertakings offered by BT to bring an end to the strategic review. Rather than trigger a 
reference under the Enterprise Act 2002, BT agreed to a series of legally enforceable undertakings (Ibid.: 2). BT 
agreed to create an access service division that would (Odell, 2005: 23): 
 
• control the ‘last mile’ of the telecommunications network; 
• be operationally independent of BT while remaining under its ownership; 
• be branded differently from BT; 
• have its own five-member board, headed by a non-executive director of BT;  
• incorporate 15,000 out of BT Wholesale’s 28,000 employees.  
 
In addition, BT also agreed to a schedule for equivalence for legacy products as well as 
stating the principles on which the company’s next generation network (NGN) would be 
developed (OFCOM, 2005a: 2ff). For its part, OFCOM stated that it would revisit issues 
such as leased lines and retail price controls in the near future (Ibid.: 5). 
In September 2005, OFCOM accepted the undertakings offered by BT (OFCOM, 
2005b). In total, 236 undertakings were made by BT. These governed the operation of 
the access service division to ensure that those wholesale customers reliant upon access 
to deliver their own products and services were treated no differently from BT’s own 
retail operations (OFCOM, 2005c). At the same time as OFCOM agreed to accept the 
undertakings, BT rebranded its access service division as Openreach (OFCOM, 2005b) 
.4. Implementing the Undertakings 
Given the magnitude of the undertakings, it is no surprise that their implementation has 
been carefully monitored. To date, OFCOM has published two evaluations of the impact 
of the telecommunications strategic review that detail the progress that BT has made in 
implementing the undertakings. In addition, five quarterly reviews as well as 
correspondence between OFCOM, BT and others have been published.6  
A useful starting point for an understanding of how the undertakings have been 
implemented is the two annual evaluations that have been published by OFCOM. The 
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 first of these, which was published in October 2006, acknowledged the effort that BT 
had invested into meeting the undertakings before identifying a range of areas where 
implementation had been less than satisfactory (OFCOM, 2006a). Eight areas where 
further action was required were identified. It is, perhaps, no surprise that these were 
broad in their scope, ranging from the need to resolve boundary issues between BT 
Wholesale and Openreach to agreeing how Openreach’s management information 
systems (MIS) and operational support systems (OSS) could be separated out from the 
rest of BT.7  
The second annual report suggested that further work was required to separate 
Openreach from the rest of BT and to develop, and subsequently deploy, equivalent 
products (OFCOM, 2007b). In addition, the report also stated (on p.4), somewhat 
vaguely, that more effort was required if the full benefits of functional separation were to 
be achieved. 
Both annual reports highlighted the difficulties to be faced in separating Openreach from 
the rest of BT, noting in particular the information system-based difficulties being 
encountered. The three information systems in question are the MIS, OSS and the 
equivalence management platform (EMP). Openreach is required to separate its OSS 
from the rest of BT in a logical manner and to separate them physically from one another 
by June 2010 (OFCOM, 2007b, 48). However, OFCOM and BT placed a different 
interpretation on logical separation, with the consequence that clarification was required 
(OFCOM, 2007d). Although this inevitably resulted in some delays, it also produced a 
clear timetable for the migration of users to physically separate systems.  
Additional time was also sought by BT to separate the MIS between Openreach and the 
rest of the company. While OFCOM did agree to this request, BT was required to assist 
users to restrict access and to define the subsequent separation process. This has largely 
been achieved although OFCOM does note (2007a: 48) that risks still remain with those 
systems that draw on BT-wide initiatives. The delivery of equivalence is supported 
through the use of the EMP8, the implementation of which has been less than 
satisfactory since it was first introduced in early 2006. The delivery of the initial system 
was delayed and subsequent versions were released with reduced functionality (OTA, 
2006a and 2006b). Perhaps more importantly, concerns have been raised as to the 
stability of the EMP (OTA, 2007a) and the extent to which the service is unavailable 
(OTA, 2007b and 2007c). Both of these have caused problems for the 
telecommunications companies using the EMP. Although these issues have been tackled 
with varying degrees of success, they have engendered a degree of uncertainty regarding 
the platform’s robustness and reliability. 
The correspondence published by OFCOM highlights some of the difficulties that have 
been encountered in the implementation of the undertakings.9 BT has, on more than one 
occasion, sought more time to implement the undertakings. Although OFCOM has 
invariably granted these requests, it is worth noting that the extensions are temporary and 
not open-ended. This correspondence is relatively brief, which is in contrast to the 
consultations surrounding the range of exemptions and variations that BT has sought 
since June 2006.  
To bring the strategic review to a swift conclusion, it was agreed that OFCOM and BT 
could consider at a later date the equivalence of inputs needs of some products 
(OFCOM, 2006e). In June 2006, BT sought exemptions and variations in 15 different 
areas, with 13 requiring consultation due to their complexity (OFCOM, 2006f). As a 
result of this consultation, OFCOM agreed to nine of the requests. The remaining four 
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 requests required additional consultation as they involved products relying on fibre 
(OFCOM, 2006e). 
 
Table 1: Variations to the undertakings 
Variation Scope  Date 
1 Products & services supplied by Access Services 
(Openreach); share schemes and BT Group Deferred Bonus 
Plan; EAB report to OFCOM; EAB Summary Annual 
Report 
Mar 2006 
2 Equipment location  Apr 2006 
3 Products & services supplied by Access Services 
(Openreach) 
Aug 2006 
4 OSS separation Sep 2006 
5 OSS separation Oct 2006 
6 Products & services supplied by Access Services 
(Openreach) 
Dec 2006 
7 Information flows & system separation Dec 2006 
8 Products & services supplied by Access Services 
(Openreach) 
Apr 2007 
9 OSS separation Jun 2007 
10 Incident management processes Oct 2007 
11 Extensions to OSS and EOI timetables Nov 2007 
12 Changes to sections 2.1 (definitions), 5 (access services) and 
6 (management & structure of BT Wholesale) 
Dec 2007 
13 Products & services supplied by Access Services 
(Openreach) 
Dec 2007 
14 Provision of equivalent products and services – changes to 
section 3.1.1, section 3.1.2 and annex 1 of the undertakings 
Dec 2007 
15 Products & services supplied by Access Services, changes to 
section 5.46.2 
May 2008 
Source: www.ofcom.org.uk/telecoms/btundertakings/exemptionsandvariations, accessed 7 June 2008 
 
In turn, this additional consultation resulted in three out of the four requests being 
granted. OFCOM granted a temporary extension until December 2007 in the case of the 
fourth request while further consultation was undertaken (OFCOM, 2007e: 2). Another 
set of exemptions and variations granted to BT was published in October 2007 and was 
once again the outcome of a consultation process that began in July of the same year 
(OFCOM, 2007f). The most recent variation request occurred in May 2008, and granted 
BT and OFCOM more time to implement the undertakings (OFCOM, 2008a). All fifteen 
granted variations are shown in Table 1. 
The published correspondence, as well as the exemptions and variations consultations 
published by OFCOM, draw attention to boundary issues. Boundary issues arise where 
the distinction between Openreach and the rest of BT is blurred. One area where 
boundary issues have arisen was noted above, namely to ensure that the information 
systems that linked Openreach with the rest of BT were altered so that the two were 
separate from one another.  
A second area where boundary issues have emerged is that of access to engineering 
resources. BT has sought to move engineers between Openreach and BT Wholesale as 
circumstances dictate (OFCOM, 2006b: 3). For example, BT requested permission from 
OFCOM to move engineers between the two divisions in the aftermath of the floods that 
swept the south of England during 2007. This was, however, a temporary measure that 
addressed a particular series of events.   
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 The quarterly reports published by OFCOM draw attention to the need to ensure that 
the ‘Chinese Walls’ between Openreach and the rest of BT are maintained (OFCOM, 
2006b and 2006d). A separate Openreach head office has been established, and some of 
the earlier concerns that the ‘Chinese Walls’ were unsatisfactory due to organisational 
changes within BT Wholesale have been addressed.10 The second report on the 
implementation of the undertakings notes that Openreach is reliant on other parts of BT 
for access to space and power within exchanges (OFCOM, 2007b: 46ff). As a 
consequence of this, it was felt that Openreach does not have adequate control over the 
products that it delivers. 
Also highlighted by the quarterly reports are the concerns expressed by other 
telecommunication operators as well as by OFCOM regarding product development. The 
former have noted that a gap existed early on between what BT announced and what was 
delivered (OFCOM, 2006b: 11), while more recently their interaction with BT has become an 
issue (OFCOM, 2006c: 9ff; OFCOM, 2006d: 10). It was alleged that this interaction was 
insufficient, and that in some cases the ability of other telecommunication operators to 
influence product specifications was limited. To this, OFCOM (2007b) adds that the pace of 
product development has been slow before acknowledging that this may be due to 
developments elsewhere in BT.11
5. Discussion 
The previous section has demonstrated that the separation of Openreach from the rest 
of BT has not been straightforward. While Openreach was established relatively swiftly in 
the aftermath of the undertakings being agreed, the actual separation of Openreach and 
BT has been more problematic in terms of both products and processes. As the 
implementation of the undertakings has progressed, BT has sought exemptions, 
variations and extensions. Such requests were perhaps inevitable given the unprecedented 
nature of the undertakings and thus may simply reflect the inherent difficulties of 
separating Openreach from the rest of BT.  
Notwithstanding the difficulties that have been experienced, the Openreach model of 
functional separation has been praised. In a speech to the European Regulators Group, 
Commissioner Reding argued that functional separation had contributed to the rapid rise 
of unbundled lines and increased network investment (Reding, 2007). When the 
undertakings were announced in September 2005, the number of unbundled lines stood 
at 123,000 (OTA, 2005). In contrast, the most recent figure published in May 2008 shows 
that there are now 4.462 million unbundled lines (OTA, 2008d). Although this growth is 
undoubtedly impressive, it has not been without its problems as we have shown above. 
Recent monthly updates from OTA show that although progress has been made in 
implementing the undertakings, with many key performance indicators improving after 
initial disappointments, problems continue to emerge such as the delays in publishing the 
WLR3 roadmap and providing the necessary functionality to other service providers 
(OTA, 2008a, 2008b and 2008c).  
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 Figure 1: Unbundled local loops, September 2005 – May 2008 
Source: monthly OTA updates, available at www.offta.org.uk 
 
There can be no doubt that BT has invested to deliver the undertakings. According to its 
most recent annual report, BT invested £35 million in a ‘proactive maintenance 
programme’ that reduced the number of faults experienced (BT, 2008: 21). The total 
amount invested by BT in financial year ending 31 March 2008 was £53 million, which 
was an increase on the corresponding figure for 2007 (£30 million) but less than n 2006 
(£70 million) (Ibid.: 105). This is, however, slightly misleading as these figures relate to 
the costs of establishing Openreach and meeting the undertakings.12 In other words, they 
do not include capital expenditure. Over the last two years, capital expenditure has 
remained steady at more or less £1.1 billion per annum.13 It is not clear, of course, how 
much of this would have occurred regardless of whether Openreach was established and 
how much is specifically due to the implementation of the undertakings.  
There are other service providers in the marketplace. One such operator is Cable & 
Wireless (C&W). Prior to the undertakings being agreed, C&W stated its intention to 
invest in LLU (Cable & Wireless, 2004) and acquired Bulldog, a broadband provider, to 
strengthen its position in the marketplace. After failing to control costs, C&W 
announced in June 2006 that it would stop offering retail products (Stafford, 2006: 22) 
although it has continued to use LLU to deliver services to business clients (Cable & 
Wireless, 2008).14
Another operator providing broadband services is BSkyB. As of 31 March 2008, BSkyB 
had 1.428 million broadband subscribers, an increase of 229,000 subscribers over the 
quarter (BSkyB, 2008: 2). In addition to acquiring Easynet at the end of 2005 for £211 
million (Wray and Milmo, 2005), BSKYB has also made subsequent investments in 
infrastructure. In the nine months ending 30 April 2008, BSkyB invested £127 million in 
its residential broadband and telephony business (BSkyB, 2008: 1). While it is not clear 
how much of this investment was targeted towards broadband, it is worth noting that it 
has been claimed that this represents the peak of its broadband-related investment cycle 
(Edgecliffe-Johnson and Fenton, 2008: 20).  
A third operator in the marketplace is Carphone Warehouse. Since announcing its 
intention to use LLU in November 2005, Carphone Warehouse has grown to become a 
significant player in the market. The company’s growth has been driven by innovative 
new products such as ‘Talk Talk Free Broadband’, launched in April 2006, which gave 
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 free broadband to those customers purchasing voice and line rental (Carphone 
Warehouse, 2007: 6). Although this was highly successful, attracting more than 500,000 
customers, losses associated with the product widened from £20 million in April to £70 
million in October 2006 (Parker & Braithwaite, 2006: 23). Accompanying the launch of 
‘Talk Talk Free Broadband’ was the intention to invest in 1,000 unbundled exchanges by 
July 2007 (Carphone Warehouse, 2007: 6). One motive for investing in LLU was that 
delivering services to customers this way was profitable, unlike the situation when 
wholesale products were used (Pratley, 2006).15  
The acquisition of AOL UK from Time Warner in December 2006 further expanded the 
company’s customer base.16 This not only served to increase the number of subscribers 
but would make the economics of LLU more attractive to Carphone Warehouse (Parker 
and Braithwaite, 2006: 23). As a consequence, it is perhaps no surprise that Carphone 
Warehouse has switched the bulk of its subscriber base on to LLU and expanded the 
number of exchanges in which it has invested (Carphone Warehouse, 2008: 5).17 
Although the expansion of the business would not be possible without infrastructure 
investment of one sort or another, it is not clear how much the company has actually 
invested as the relevant figures are consolidated with other investments in its annual 
report.18 This said, Charles Dunstone, the chief executive of Carphone Warehouse, has 
recently been quoted as saying that the company has made “large expenditure 
commitments towards unbundling” (Parker, 2008a: 19). 
Charles Dunstone has also raised the issue of the fees that Carphone Warehouse pays 
Openreach. Charge ceilings for WLR and LLU services were set by OFCOM between 
December 2004 and January 2006.19 Since then, Openreach has failed to achieve the 10 
per cent return that it is permitted with the consequence that BT would like to raise these 
charges (Parker, 2008e: 18). BT has argued that the aforementioned charge ceilings do 
not reflect the underlying costs of providing services and that they need to be amended 
to reflect the changing nature of the product portfolio being delivered.20 Unsurprisingly 
Carphone Warehouse has a different view, stating that it would unfair to ‘change the 
game’ (Parker, 2008a: 19). Notwithstanding the complexities of determining rates of 
return and charges that the consultation document – OFCOM (2008a) – highlights, the 
implications are clear: if OFCM agrees with BT, the costs for other service providers of 
using Openreach’s network will increase.21  
In the process of assessing the costs and benefits of functional separation, Amendola et al 
(2007) state that functional separation enhances competition. One measure of this is 
market share while another is the price and speed of broadband products. As can be seen 
from Figure 2, BT remains the largest ISP whereas the market shares of Orange, Tiscali, 
Virgin Media and smaller ISPs have all fallen. In contrast, the market shares of Carphone 
Warehouse and BSkyB have both risen since the undertakings were agreed. 
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Figure 2: Market share of ISPs 
 
Source: www.broadbanduk.org 
 
OFCOM (2008a: 14) states that broadband prices have fallen whereas speeds have increased. 
While there is clear evidence that prices have fallen22, there has been much discussion of late 
regarding broadband speeds. Average download speeds vary considerably across the UK, 
from 4.5 Mbps in London to 2.3 Mbps in Northern Ireland (BBC, 2008). In addition, the 
relationship between the advertised and the actual broadband speeds has been questioned, 
with a discrepancy being noted between the two. According to Point Topic (2008), as 
advertised speeds increase the proportion of subscribers receiving such speeds declines. The 
discrepancy between advertised and actual broadband speeds has prompted OFCOM to issue 
a voluntary code of conduct containing eight principles.23
6. Conclusion 
This paper has focused on functional separation in the UK. The September 2005 
decision to opt for functional separation represents a milestone in the regulation of the 
UK telecommunications market, and in the process imposed a range of undertakings on 
BT. The process of unravelling the numerous undertakings that bound Openreach to the 
rest of BT has proved to be more difficult and protracted than anticipated. Not only 
were extensions, variations and exemptions sought, but Openreach also took longer than 
anticipated to meet several key performance indicators. If nothing else, these difficulties 
suggest that implementing functional separation is by no means straightforward.  
Nevertheless, the period subsequent to the adoption of functional separation has seen 
significant broadband competitors emerge in the form of Carphone Warehouse and, to a 
lesser extent, BSkyB. For both Carphone Warehouse and BSkyB, LLU plays a central 
role in their strategies, not least because LLU is a more profitable way to service their 
customers than WLR. While LLU does not appear to have spurred other service 
providers into investing in other parts of the ‘ladder of investment’ as suggested by Cave 
(2006b), they do appear to have invested relatively large sums to deliver LLU-
underpinned broadband services. With the emergence of LLU as a vehicle for the 
deployment of broadband services, not only has the importance of BT in the market 
place been elevated but so too has the necessity of ensuring that the relationship between 
BT and those companies using its network is functioning as intended.  
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 Functional separation was adopted to resolve the tensions that existed between BT and 
those companies wishing to access its network to provide their own services, with the 
undertakings providing a framework for assessing the state of this relationship. As the 
third anniversary of the undertakings nears, it could be argued that the relationship 
between BT and other service providers has improved over time as LLU uptake has 
improved although relations may sour if BT successfully argues for charge ceilings to be 
raised. If the relationship between BT and other operators does sour and undertakings 
are breached, OFCOM could refer the matter to the Competition Commission. The 
unpredictable outcome of such a referral may mean that OFCOM is unwilling to make 
such a reference and will adopt a more pragmatic approach to implementing and 
monitoring the undertakings.  
 
Notes 
 
1.  This is not to suggest that this is the only feasible categorization of structural 
separation. Dounoukos & Henderson (2003: 44f), for example, distinguish between 
‘actual’ structural separation and ‘internal’ separation. With respect to the former, 
they identify four alternatives – club or joint ownership, operational separation, 
separation into several vertically integrated companies and separation of the non-
competitive components into several parts – while three ‘internal’ separation 
alternatives – accounting, functional and corporate – are suggested.  
2.   While referring to wholesale and retail, OECD (2006: 23) states that incentives may 
be given t wholesale managers that conflict with those provided to retail managers. 
This reinforces the suggestion that incentives should be localised and not tied to the 
overall profitability of the operator. 
3. European Regulators Group (2007: 4) provides a summary of the measures 
undertaken in countries where functional separation has been implemented under the 
three headings of functional, employee and information separation. Interestingly, not 
all measures have been implemented in all cases, and some are only feasible in 
conjunction with others.   
4.   In 2004 just 46% of UK homes were passed by broadband-enabled cable (OFCOM, 
2004c: 38). Subsequent communication market reviews have shown that in 2005 and 
2006, digital cable was available to 45% of the UK population (OFCOM, 2007a: 15). 
For a discussion of the financial woes of cable operators see, for example, Curwen 
(2004). 
5.  See, for example, de Bijl and Peitz (2005) for a discussion of unbundling that 
highlights the relatively slow uptake of local loop unbundling in the UK compared to 
other European Union member states. 
6.  These reports, as well as the other material published by OFCOM relating to the 
telecommunications strategic review and the implementation of the undertakings, can 
be found at www.ofcom.org.uk/telecoms/btundertakings.  
7. See OFCOM (2006a: 2) for a full list of the eight areas identified that require further 
action. 
8.   The EMP is an information system that supports the delivery of the products offered 
by Openreach. Given the anticipated large volumes of some of these products, the 
system is designed to be automated to ensure that services are provided as demanded.  
9.  See www.ofcom.org.uk/telecoms/btundertakings/exemptionsandvariations for a full 
list of the correspondence between BT and OFCOM that has been published. 
10. BT Wholesale has been reorganized with two management units – BT Wholesale 
Core Network Services and BT Wholesale Value-added Network Services – being 
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 established (OFCOM, 2006b: 5). The concern expressed by some 
telecommunications operators was that this would complicate the implementation of 
the ‘Chinese Walls’ that were established. However, OFCOM stated that more time 
should be given before making a judgement as to whether the ‘Chinese Walls’ were 
being breached. 
11. Two developments are noted, namely, the implementation of the undertakings as well 
as the development of the company’s 21st century network. 
12. It is worth noting that the annual report states that these figures are estimates of the 
incremental and directly attributable costs incurred as a consequence of establishing 
Openreach on the one hand and meeting the undertakings on the other (BT, 2008: 
105). 
13. For the year ended 31 March 2007, capital expenditure was £1,108 million while the 
figure for the following year, albeit an estimate on the part of BT, was £1,100 million 
(OFCOM, 2008a: 20). Although capital expenditure has remained more or less steady 
since Openreach was established, the 2007 figure did represent a slight increase on 
the previous year’s level of £1,038 million (OFCOM, 2008a: 20).  
14. Cable & Wireless does not break up capital expenditure by its European, Asian and 
US businesses by geography or product. Thus, it is unclear how much the company 
has invested in LLU in the UK. Having said this, capital expenditure by this business 
did decrease from £235 million in 2006/07 to £221 million in 2007/08 (Cable & 
Wireless, 2008: 21). 
15. According to Pratley (2006), Carphone Warehouse would make a profit of £7 per 
month per customer when using LLU whilst it would lose £5 per month when using 
wholesale products. 
16. With the acquisition of AOL UK, Carphone Warehouse controlled 16% of the 
broadband market (Carphone Warehouse, 2007: 6). Carphone Warehouse sought to 
expand its presence in the UK broadband market by bidding to acquire the UK 
operations of Tiscali, which had 1.8 million broadband subscribers at the time. 
Although Parker (2008d: 17) reports that C&W is no longer in contention, 
subsequent reports contest this.  
17. At the end of 2006, 19% of the company’s broadband subscribers were located in 
unbundled exchanges (Carphone Warehouse, 2008: 5). This figure had increased to 
61% by the end of the following year. Over the same period, the number of 
unbundled exchanges increased from 569 to 2,457. Only part of this increase – 924 – 
was due to the acquisition of AOL UK.  
18. Total investment increased from £351.1 million in 2006 to £562.2 million in 2007 
(Carphone Warehouse, 2007: 15), with ‘acquisition of property, plant and equipment’ 
increasing from £89.4 million to £161.4 million over the same period (Carphone 
Warehouse, 2007: 36). Some, but not all, of this presumably relates to LLU. 
19. See OFCOM (2008a: 1f) for details. The charge ceilings were as follows: £100.68 for 
residential WLR, £110.00 for business WLR, £81.69 for MPF and £15.60 for SMPF.  
20. The move away from WLR has, for example, contributed to a decline in Openreach’s 
rate of return (OFCOM, 2008a: 18). 
21. The consultation documents ask 25 questions in all, with submissions being possible 
until 8 August 2008. 
22. See, for example, OFCOM (2006g: 120), OFCOM (2007a: 298) or OFCOM (2008a: 
15). 
23. See OFCOM (2008c) for further details. 
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